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We will outline a theory of agency cast in theoretical psychology, viewed as a branch
of a non-eliminativist biology. Our proposal will be based on an evolutionary view of the
nature and functioning of the mind(s), reconsidered in a radically subjectivist, radically
constructivist framework. We will argue that the activities of control systems should be
studied in terms of interaction. Specifically, what an agent does belongs to the coupling
of its internal dynamics with the dynamics of the external world. The internal dynamics,
rooted in the species’ phylogenetic history as well as in the individual’s ontogenetic path,
(a) determine which external dynamics are relevant to the organism, that is, they create
the subjective ontology that the organism senses in the external world, and (b) determine
what types of activities and actions the agent is able to conceive of and to adopt in
the current situation. The external dynamics that the organism senses thus constitute
its subjective environment. This notion of coupling is basically suitable for whichever
organism one may want to consider. However, remarkable differences exist between the
ways in which coupling may be realized, that is, between different natures and ways of
functioning of control systems. We will describe agency at different phylogenetic levels: at
the very least, it is necessary to discriminate between non-Intentional species, Intentional
species, and a subtype of the latter called meta-Intentional. We will claim that agency can
only be understood in a radically subjectivist perspective, which in turn is best grounded
in a view of the mind as consciousness and experience. We will thus advance a radically
constructivist view of agency and of several correlate notions (like meaning and ontology).
Keywords: agency, interaction, phylogeny, cognition theoretical neuroscience, theoretical psychology
INTRODUCTION
Most, if not all, research paradigms in psychology and in the cognitive sciences agree that the mind
is a control system. If behaviorists acknowledged that minds exist at all, they would probably say
that they are such systems. Classic information-processing and computational psychologists have
often talked explicitly of the mind in such terms. Allen Newell, for example, one of the leading
figures in classical cognitive science, wrote that the mind is “the control system that guides the
behaving organism in its complex interactions with the dynamic real world” (Newell, 1990, p. 43).
Artificial intelligence, Artificial life, and autonomous robotics have a necessary focus on control
systems, and the same holds for the most recent trend in scientific psychology, namely the attempt
at the integration and cross-fertilization of psychology and the neurosciences.
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We basically agree that the main or exclusive function of
the mind is to overview and control an organism’s activities.
However, the notion of control system is not easily defined, nor
are the nature and the functioning of the particular control
system that is themind.
Newell’s definition is cast in terms of behaving organisms. This
definition is interesting under several respects. One is that it
adopts a third-person perspective on the topic of action: generally
speaking, no agent would conceive of its own activities and
actions in terms of behaviors. Again, this is typical not only of
classical cognitive science, but of most approaches to the study of
control systems as well.
Second, Newell’s definition entails that any control system
that guides a “behaving organism” is a mind, that is that any
animal endowed with a nervous system, from the Cnidaria or the
Ctenophora (Hatschek, 1888; Moroz et al., 2014) tomammals has
a mind, and that the main or only product of an organism’s mind
is behavior.
Our position diverges fromNewell’s on both issues. As regards
the former, we will adopt a subjectivist perspective of agency,
namely that agency can only be understood in the first person,
and that the first person has causal powers, that is, it is not
a mere epiphenomenon of non-subjective machinery endowed
with “real” powers. However, the debate about subjectivity and
its role is at least as old as psychology is, and we do not think that
proponents of either position might be convinced to change their
mind by a “silver bullet” argument of sorts. Thus, rather than
arguing in favor of a re-evaluation of subjectivity, we will skip to
the subsequent step and try to develop a possible description of
cognitive architectures that may follow from such re-evaluation.
We will also object to Newell’s implication that any control
system from the simplest to the most complex is a mind. The
problem with this notion is that it misses too many crucial
features of what a mind is: in particular, the issues of meaning
and Intentionality. We will propose that all agents are not equal,
and that some differentiation be made between different types of
biological control systems.
Still another crucial point of Newell’s definition is that it
talks of behaving organisms. It has often been claimed in
classical cognitive science that minds may be embodied not
only in biological bodies, but also in thermostats, computers,
and generally in any physical and computational mechanism
capable of supporting the basic operations of intelligence. This
is a consequence of the multiple realizability thesis that follows
from the computational postulate on the nature of the mind (see
e.g., Turing, 1950; Haugeland, 1981; Pylyshyn, 1984).
While the ideas that we will discuss in this paper are
incompatible with computationalism, we do not have the space
here to engage in an examination and criticism of it (for which
see e.g., Searle, 1980, 1992; Tirassa, 1994; Manera and Tirassa,
2010; Tirassa and Vallana, 2010). We will circumscribe our
discussion to biological entities; it may be interesting, however,
to notice that Newell (1990) himself, in apparent contrast with
his own previous work (e.g., Newell and Simon, 1976), talks of
behaving organisms.
Actually, one of the goals of this paper is to provide for a
biologically based conception of interaction and agency, and to
argue that this requires biology to take a step from its implicitly
or explicitly eliminativist positions concerning the existence
and the causal roles of subjectivity. Instead, we will claim
that agency can only be understood in a radically subjectivist
perspective, which in turn is best grounded in a view of the mind
as consciousness and experience. We will also advance a radically
constructivist view of agency and of several correlate notions
(likemeaning and ontology).
WORLD, ENVIRONMENT, AND
INTERACTION
Living organisms have several interesting properties that
differentiate them from other entities. These can be resumed in
the notion that living beings do not passively exist in the world,
but actively interact with and within it.
The most apparent manifestation of this property is that they
are capable of maintaining, at least within certain boundaries,
their own coherence and autonomy in the face of a world which
does not take particular care of them. This is not to say that the
world is hostile toward them; sometimes it is, of course, but most
of the time it is just indifferent.
Coherence means that living organisms have a substantially
harmonious anatomic and functional structure, each part of
which, under normal conditions, concurs to keep them alive
and healthy and participates more or less congruously to
the relations that they entertain with the surrounding world.
Autonomy means that living organisms create and maintain an
internal environment which follows dynamics of its own, that are
neither completely separated from nor totally determined by the
dynamics of the external environment.
Coherence and autonomy are not independent of each other;
on the contrary, they shape each other in a dynamic circular
relation which lies at the very foundation of life. Together, they
provide for the adaptivity of organisms, that is, for their capability
of creating and maintaining a dynamic compatibility with the
environment in which they are immersed. When such capability
falls under certain thresholds, the organism dies.
There are several ways in which living beings stay coherent
and autonomous. One is by creating and maintaining a
permeable separation between their internal environment and
the external milieu. Indeed, it is because such separation exists
that talk of an internal environment becomes possible at all.
The internal environment differs from the external one in that
it is structured (coherent) as well as in several physical and
chemical features, which may range from temperature to the
concentration of various substances like structural proteins,
enzymes, nucleic acids, metabolic products and by-products, and
so on. Permeability allows for an adaptive management of such
differences, without the need for the organism to become a totally
self-contained and self-sufficient universe, which would of course
be impossible. In other words, organisms rely for their survival
on precisely those world dynamics from which they have to keep,
under other respects, a certain degree of separation.
Thus, the second way of maintaining coherence and
autonomy is by exploiting the features of the environment that
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are relevant to the organism. Most living species, for example, are
positively or negatively sensitive to degrees of light, temperature,
or the concentration of various nutrients and toxins. Again,
organisms have to rely on the external world in order to secure
their autonomy, survival, and welfare.
A third way of maintaining coherence and autonomy is
by exploiting the biological, behavioral, etc. features of other
individuals, belonging to the same species or to others. This
process may be viewed as just a special case of the previous one;
however, given the importance that it gains in the species that
adopt it, it deserves special consideration. Predation, symbiosis,
or parasitism are obvious examples of how organisms may
interact with each other. As interestingly, many organisms
depend on each other for their own survival, as well as for the
perpetuation of some parts of themselves, via sexual reproduction
and related behaviors. Sexual reproduction in its turn imposes
specific constraints on several features of the organisms, ranging
from sexual dimorphism to each individual’s need to be a
desirable sexual mate. The possibility of relying on the others
for one’s own survival may become so prominent that the
individual members of some species may lose their reproductive
capabilities—as is the case, for example, with eusociality in social
insects and other species where the biological unit is, under
certain respects, the community—or end up sacrificing their own
life so that other conspecifics may instead keep theirs.
We said above that living beings maintain their coherence and
autonomy not thanks to isolation from the external world, but
thanks to a delicate and dynamic interaction with it. They actually
are immersed in a world with which they need to cope, if they are
to survive and prosper.
The notion of coping with the world, however, is tricky. No
organism could ever cope with all the features of the world. The
world is too complex, too rich of dynamics that are more or less
independent of each other, for any organism to keep track of the
whole of it. It would anyway be extravagant to keep track of all
the incidents and occurrences in the universe. Each organism can
limit itself to cope with some of the external dynamics that are
relevant to its internal environment, its survival and welfare, and
possibly its interests and goals, at least as far as organisms with
interests and goals are concerned.
This is not merely an issue of physical distance. It is trivially
true that what happens in the Andromeda galaxy is practically
irrelevant to the survival and welfare of a shrimp in the Atlantic
ocean. The real point instead is that most of what “objectively”
happens even in the shrimp’s immediately proximal world is
exactly as irrelevant to it.
The only happenings that do count for an organism are those
that potentially affect its well-being, its survival, its reproduction,
and its interests and goals. No organism could ever cope with
all such occurrences, of course (if it did, it would never die);
however, the more occurrences it can cope with, and the better
it does so, the better its chances of prosperity are.
Each organism is thus capable of interacting with the
occurrences and incidents of the world that are relevant to it;
circularly, it is precisely because an organism can cope with such
occurrences and incidents that they are relevant to it. What
happens out of this set of world dynamicsmay affect the organism
in several ways, at least from the viewpoint of an external
observer capable of noticing the ongoing events, but will not be
relevant from the organism’s viewpoint. Think, for example, of
radiations: since an organism does not interact with them, they
simply do not exist to it, even if they kill it.
What is the nature of the occurrences and incidents that are
relevant to an organism? Apart from a few physical and chemical
parameters, most of them have nothing to do with what we
consider the world’s fundamental dynamics. We are accustomed
to believe that the universe is made up of protons, neutrons, and
electrons, or of even smaller particles, of electromagnetic waves
and other forms of energy, and so on, and that world events
are made up of movements, variations, and transformations of
such entities and aggregates thereof. However, no control system
of a living organism deals directly with electrons, atoms, or
molecules (except, of course, for that of human researchers in
fundamental physics, on working hours). What living beings deal
with is air, food, preys and predators, rivers, trees and mountains,
sexual mates, water, parasites, paths, obstacles, and dangers:
all entities that, whatever their true or ultimate structure and
composition, are nonetheless interesting as entities in themselves,
characterized by dynamics of their own that are not reducible
to those of fundamental physics and chemistry. And, of course,
from the viewpoint of most organisms there just are no such
things as fundamental physics and chemistry: as far as we
know, these notions are characteristic of a comparatively small,
historically given subset of the human species.
This means, in practice, that it is the organism itself that
selects which, of all the happenings in the universe, are relevant
to it: which peculiar configurations of atoms and energy are
food, water, threats, opportunities, mates. In this sense, the
environment is, to each organism, subjective: not because no
external reality exists, independent of the organism, or because
such reality cannot affect its welfare or its very existence, but
because each organism is only capable of interacting with certain
dynamics of the universe, with which it interacts according to the
ways and ends that its nature allows.
Thus, a certain dynamics of the external world can be
inconsequential to an organism, or influent but not relevant
(because the organism is not equipped to interact with
it—something that only an external observer might appreciate),
or relevant in one way or another (being a threat, an opportunity,
something edible, something with which to reproduce, and
so on).
In other words, it is the internal dynamics of an organism that
create the external ones and, in making so, give them meaning.
Meaning is, therefore, subjective.
Each organism thus creates a certain set of external dynamical
meanings with which it then interacts. The specific ways in which
it does so are dictated by the biology of the species to which
it belongs as well as, in part, by its own ontogenetic trajectory.
It is the features of the organism’s biology that establish its
physical and chemical requirements, what kinds of geographical
environment it will find more suitable, what food it needs and
how it can recognize and obtain it, what dangers it has to
defend from, whether, why and how it has to interact with its
conspecifics, and so on. Within the same species, there always
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is room for individual variations. These may be due to small
differences between the genotypes or between the phenotypes to
which they give rise in their interaction with the environment
(Lewontin, 1998), to learning, to individual preferences, and so
on. However, of course, the similarities between the members of
a certain species are much greater than the differences.
There can instead be remarkable differences between species.
In evolutionary time, phylogeny has generated and selected
many different ways to be in the world: all of them are
equally subjective, all equally legitimate, all more or less equally
compatible with the real world, all more or less equally capable of
taking care of the organisms’ explicit or implicit interests.
The nature of the relation occurring between an organism
and its environment thus depends, in the last analysis, on the
interaction between its genotype (which results from evolution),
its phenotype (which emerges from the interaction between
the genotype and the ontogenic environment), its idiosyncratic
developmental paths, and the environment itself.
THE EVOLUTION OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
The range of processes that may fall under the label of
“an organism’s interaction with its subjective environment” is
very broad. Multicellular organisms typically interact with the
environment on many levels: from the exchange of water,
ions, and metabolites, to processes aimed at recognizing and
destructing non-self molecules and microorganisms, to the
production of substances that may affect the metabolism, the
growth or the behavior of a conspecific, an aggressor or a prey,
and so on. While the final operative details of each of these
functions are typically assigned to a specialized organ, apparatus,
or system, all of an organism’s parts participate, in one way
or another, to the organism’s interactions with the external
environment.
In the phylogeny of animals, furthermore, an organ—or, better
still, a whole system: the nervous system—has developed which
specializes in the peculiar function of centralizing, governing, and
coordinating, at least to a certain extent, certain features of the
interaction with the environment.
The initial appearance and evolutionary success of this system
were in the service of movement. To be capable of moving from
a sunny area to a shadowy one and vice versa, or of actively
searching for water and food or fleeing from a danger is extremely
useful to an organism. This requires a behavioral coordination
that can only be achieved by a specialized management of the
relevant processes.
Circularly, the nervous system originated from sensory-motor
circuitry for phototaxis and chemotaxis. Cells endowed with
electric properties enabling them to react to light or chemicals
progressively differentiated into what will become a system of
specialized sensors and effectors and, later on, a system in charge
of coordinating and mediating the management of the various
contingencies and opportunities that the animal meets in the
environment.
This type of circular relation is typical of biology (Mayr,
1997; Gould, 2002). Organisms do not evolve because the world
forces them to do so: that is, they do not progressively become
more adapt to an objectively given environment which “poses
problems” that they must “face” by evolving (see also Gould and
Lewontin, 1979).
Something very different happens instead: each organism
creates, through its peculiar ways of interacting, a subjective
environment of its own (an Umwelt, in Uexküll, 1934, words),
and it is to this that it, circularly, is adapted. The “problems”
that living beings must “face” are not in the world, but in
their interaction with the world; analogously, the “solutions”
that evolve are not in the organisms, but in the interaction
that they have with their subjective environment. Thus,
there are neither real “problems” nor real “solutions”: only
more or less successful ways of creating and maintaining
sustainable Umwelten. A significant genetic mutation can, under
certain conditions, give rise to a new species, characterized
by different ways of interacting with a different subjective
environment.
Of course, each organism’s subjective environment has to be
compatible with the real world, whatever its ultimate nature
may be. This is, indeed, a matter of compatibility, not of
problem solving. Evolution is not a movement on the gradient
of adaptation toward optimality.
Thus, as far as nervous systems are concerned, their
appearance in phylogeny is by no means necessary: the “real
world” does not “pose problems” requiring coordination and
control to an organism which, having no such capabilities, finds
itself in the need to evolve them. Actually, countless living species
have no control system whatsoever, least of all one made of
neurons. On the other hand, nervous systems, once appeared,
significantly alter the types of interaction that organisms can
generate. Coordination and control become salient features of
such interaction, which gives rise to still different types of
interaction, and so on. As a result, a whole evolutionary lineage
takes a wholly new course.
By the same line of reasoning, not all control systems need
be similar both in structure (which is obvious) and in the type
of interaction they create and maintain with the world. We will
propose an outline of two very large-scale types of such systems,
which we will call non-Intentional and Intentional, based on an
analysis of the possible types of interactions with the world. A
particularly interesting subtype of Intentional architectures called
meta-Intentional will also be described.
Intentionality, or aboutness, is a mind’s property of being
able to entertain semantic (meaningful) relationships with the
world. In philosophy (e.g., Searle, 1983), artificial intelligence
(e.g., Rao and Georgeff, 1992), ethology (e.g., Prato Previde
et al., 1992), and cognitive science (e.g., Airenti et al., 1993;
Tirassa, 1999b), Intentionality1 often is characterized in terms of
mental states like various types of desires, beliefs, and intentions,
with propositional content. This is often couched within the
computational postulate about the nature of the mind, whereby
cognition consists in the syntactic manipulation of symbols
(Manera and Tirassa, 2010; Tirassa and Vallana, 2010).
1Conventionally (e.g., Searle, 1983), Intentionality as aboutness is written with a
capital initial, so to immediately distinguish it from the acceptation of having an
intention or doing something intentionally.
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The computational postulate, however, is far from being
unanimously accepted, and other areas of literature tend
to equate Intentionality with consciousness or phenomenal
experience or, as it is often said, to view representations as
happening at the interaction of the conscious mind/brain and the
external world (see e.g., Heidegger, 1927; Merleau-Ponty, 1945;
Nagel, 1986; Varela et al., 1991; Searle, 1992; Varela, 1996). This
means, among the rest, that the mere neural coding of sensory
stimuli does not count as representation (e.g., Clark, 2001).
This is also our view. For the analysis that follows, a
simple definition of Intentionality as synonym with aboutness,
semantics, and phenomenal experience will suffice.
TYPES OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
What nervous systems do is to mediate in wholly new ways
between the animal’s internal dynamics and the external ones.
Simple mobile animals are characterized by taxes, that is,
movements in space along physical-chemical gradients such as
light, temperature or the concentration of certain molecules.
When nervous systems appear in phylogeny, taxes are substituted
for by locomotion, that is, active movements, endogenously
generated from internal states like the variation of certain
physiological parameters, the perception of relevant entities in
the external world as well as, a few millions of years later, desires
and opinions.
An animal’s internal dynamics end up being the very center
of its interaction with its subjective environment. This leads to
the differentiation of several types of internal dynamics, and
therefore to a progressive increase in the structural complexity
of the interaction that the animal is capable of generating.
Of course, the control systems of animals are not all alike. The
very anatomy and physiology of control systems are strikingly
different across species. Differences in the types of interaction
generated follow accordingly.
Non-Intentional Control Systems
The evolution of nervous systems may be described in several
ways. In principle, each such description, if correct, should match
the others; however, current knowledge is far from providing
maps of such precision. What is available is, on the one side, a
great deal of punctiform analyses of single behavioral or cognitive
functions in single species and, on the other side, a few rough
decompositions as tentative identifications of wide phases in the
phylogeny of control systems. Our discussion will fall into the
latter area: based in part on previous work (Tirassa et al., 2000)
we will propose an extremely large-scale classification of control
systems, from the viewpoint of their (hypothetical) subjective
functioning.
After the appearance of control systems, the next crucial step
corresponds to the transition from invertebrates to vertebrates,
characterized among the rest by the appearance of encephalic and
cortical structures (Gans and Northcutt, 1983). Such anatomic
transition is likely to find a functional correspondence in the
appearance of phenomenal experience in the proper sense, that
is, of consciousness, or awareness, or at least of object-based
cognition, which is its primary manifestation. Despite several
studies (e.g., Menzel and Giurfa, 2001; Menzel et al., 2006;
Bateson et al., 2011; Mendl et al., 2011; Gibson et al., 2015), we
still do not know whether and how invertebrates are conscious.
Even if they were, however, there would probably be nothing that
they would be conscious of; at least, nothing in their behavior
lets us think so (see e.g., the discussion of phonotaxis in crickets
in Clark, 2001; Hedwig and Poulet, 2005; Hedwig, 2006; Hennig,
2009). Even in the apparently most complicated cases (such as
the famous “dance” of honeybees) their behavior can invariably
be explained in terms of comparatively simple transformations
of sensory signals into motor commands (see e.g., Kesner and
Olton, 1990; Wehner, 2003; Poulet and Hedwig, 2005).
Winged insects, for example, prepare for landing as a reaction
to the visual expansion of a texture from below, signaling a
surface rapidly getting closer. Analogously, they prepare for
flight as a reaction to the contraction of a texture from below
(signaling a surface rapidly getting farther) as well as to the
expansion of a texture from above (signaling a potential danger
approaching; Lindemann and Egelhaaf, 2012). This non-object-
based mechanism is comparatively simple and extraordinarily
effective; so simple and effective, indeed, that it has not
undergone significant evolution over the last several million
years.
However, nothing in the behavior of winged insects makes us
think that they have any semantics for, or conscious experience
of, surfaces for landing or of dangers approaching. To them,
a texture is worth another, provided it activates the takeoff or
landing mechanisms. They appear to be completely unable to
discriminate between a rose petal falling and the newspaper with
which an exasperated human is striving to kill them.
If these animals are conscious, we are unable to understand
what they are conscious of, and, therefore, why they should
be conscious at all. One hypothesis that could be made is
that consciousness might be a necessary property of any
neuronal system (but then, even of a neuron in isolation?). Such
hypothesis, however, is not necessarily better than others, nor
would it explain what such animals could be conscious of.
Intentional Control Systems
Intentionality is the property of entertaining semantic, that
is meaningful, relations with the world (Brentano, 1874). Its
appearance is a big turn in phylogeny: while the case of
invertebrates is uncertain, it can safely be claimed that vertebrates
are conscious because they experience the world, that is they give
meaning to it. Intentionality can only be conscious (Searle, 1992):
experience requires a point of view (in a sense, experience is a
point of view) and a point of view has to be someone’s point
of view, therefore subjective (Nagel, 1986). Thus, there is no
experience without subjectivity and, of course, no subjectivity
without consciousness.
This conception is different to the general consensus in
mainstream psychology. Most scientific paradigms from the
nineteenth century to the 21st build on the assumption that
consciousness is substantially irrelevant, or only marginally
or occasionally relevant, and that what really matters is
unconscious, non-subjective, non-meaningful knowledge and
processes. Although a thorough discussion of these issues would
fall outside the scope of this work, it may be useful to spend a
few words.
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In the perspective we are trying to outline, the mind is neither
an epiphenomenon (as it is in behaviorism, neural reductionism,
and related forms of eliminativism) nor a set of descriptions (as
it is in classical cognitive science and computational psychology).
Both such accounts are untenable for philosophical (e.g., Searle,
1980, 1992; Nagel, 1986; Johnson, 1987; Varela et al., 1991)
and biological (e.g., Edelman, 1992; Varela, 1996) reasons;
furthermore, they are, in a sense, equivalent, in that both are
rooted in, and possible consequences of, dualism (Tirassa, 1999a).
Instead, themind is amaterial property of the brain, whichmeans
that cognitive causation does not go from brain to brain and from
brain to mind, but from mind/brain to mind/brain; better still,
since brains do not grow in vases, frommind/body tomind/body.
That we have no hint at how this is possible, that is, at how a
few kilograms of seemingly undistinguished matter may have the
property of being subjective, does not make it less real. Actually,
all existing theories are as obscure on this point: how does
subjectivity occur as an epiphenomenon? how does it emerge
from computation? Therefore, instead of endlessly arguing in
favor or against the various views, we will just try to go on, trying
instead to develop a few consequences of our approach, from
which it might be judged more aptly.
To equate mind, consciousness, subjectivity, meaning, and
experience also means that there is no Self, if the word is taken to
refer to a homunculus or mental entity which is abstracted from,
and exists independently of, space and time. Instead, the mind
re-creates itself from instant to instant. The sense of continuity
that we perceive depends on the fact that each “slice” of such re-
creation is causally generated by the meshing of the preceding
one and the current interaction with the world, and so on, back
in time, up to the very first instant when our mind began to exist.
Each such “slice” in the functioning of a mind/body literally
is the product of the previous history of that mind/body, plus
its current interactional dynamics. The patterns with which the
mind/body re-creates itself are rooted in the evolutionary history
of the species to which the organism belongs. At least in certain
species, such patterns also depend on and, circularly, generate
individual differences whose roots are to be found in genetic
variations between individuals as well as in the details of each
individual’s interaction with the world (that is, its ontogenetic
history). In a metacognitive species like ours, the latter includes
the mind’s interaction with itself (that is, its autobiography) and
with other minds and the artifacts they generate (that is, social
and cultural history).
Another point worth remarking is that this conception of
the mind requires that it be identified neither with attention (at
least because we are conscious of several things on which we do
not focus our attention) nor with abstract or formal reasoning,
language, or self-awareness. The latter capabilities depend on the
existence of consciousness but are not identifiable with it, both
for analytical reasons and because most Intentional species do
not appear to possess them.
INTERACTION AND BEHAVIOR
Nervous systems, we said, are control systems. What they control
is not, as in Newell’s definition cited in the introduction, the
organism’s behavior, but its interaction; or, at least, certain
features of the overall interaction. There are many reasons why
this remark is crucial.
The first is that behavior is a third-person term. Behavior only
exists in the eye of an observer who pursues interests of its own,
not in that of the “behaving” organism. Control systems do not
behave: they work in the first person.
Actually, non-Intentional control systems only work in the
first person in a very peculiar sense, because, as we saw, there is no
reason to think that “there is anybody home.” Notwithstanding,
what such systems produce is interaction anyway, but one of
a kind that consists in the mere activation of motor patterns
starting from the meshing of sensory patterns with relevant
physiological internal states.
Another reason why control systems are better said to produce
interaction than behavior is that the nervous system does several
things beside “producing behavior” (whatever acceptation the
term is given) or even “reasoning.” Many bodily functions fall,
wholly or partly, under its jurisdiction: it controls, for example,
the activity of the cardiovascular, the respiratory, the digestive,
and the endocrine systems.
These activities are not independent of, or separate from,
the generation of interaction. Notwithstanding their anatomical,
physiological, and functional variety, the components of the
nervous system work in strict synergy, which, of course, is
precisely why it is a system. All of them are directly or indirectly
interconnected, so that the nervous system is best described as a
single interaction-producing network of cells. While some parts
of it are more involved than others in the various aspects of
interaction, it certainly is not an assemblage of “encapsulated
modules” working in isolation from one another.
Consider, for example, what happens to a mammal who
perceives a predator—say, a gazelle and a lion. For a start, such
“perception” is mental activity: what we mean when we say that
the gazelle perceives the lion is that it views a certain entity in
the world as a specific type of potential threat to its security. To
say that this experience is subjective does not imply that the lion
literally is a creation of the gazelle’s mind, but that its meaning is.
“Predator” is a semantic relation between the two animals in the
current situation, not an intrinsic property of one of them: to an
elephant, a cat is much less a predator than it is to a mouse; to
the mouse, a lion is much less a predator than it is for a gazelle;
to the gazelle, a lion on the horizon is much less a predator than
it is a lion 100m away. To a hypothetical gazelle equipped with
an armor plate and pump-action rifle, the lion would be nothing
more than an occasional nuisance2.
When an animal perceives such a danger, its blood pressure
rises, as the result of a variation in heart activity and in the total
2It could be objected that “predator” is a word, and that gazelles have no language.
Of course we do not think that the gazelle says to itself “Alas, another goddamn
lion. . . alright: time to run.” We have already argued against the identification of
semantics and language. It could also be objected that the lion will actually eat the
gazelle if it catches it, and that there is nothing semantic in this, and therefore that
the lion is objectively a predator. Again, true, but we are concerned here with the
gazelle’s mind, not with ethology as construed by human scientists: it is unlikely
that the gazelle views the ongoing situation in terms of the nutritional habits of
Felis leo as they are portrayed on educational TV channels.
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caliber of its blood vessels. Furthermore, there is a redistribution
of the blood flow away from certain districts (like the digestive
system) and toward others (like the brain and the locomotor
system). Respiratory frequency increases. Several hormones and
other substances are released in the blood and go to affect
the functioning of an array of organs and apparatuses. As a
result of these complex modifications in its mind/body, the
animal will become prepared to a fight-or-flight activity. Such
condition will modify in turn the subsequent flow of the animal’s
mental dynamics; e.g., it will be frightened, but also more ready,
compared to what would have been in a different situation, to
search its subjective environment for certain relevant affordances.
The gazelle might, for example, act so to draw the lion’s attention
away from its offspring; it might recognize a river not as a
reservoir of drinkable water, but as an obstacle for its enemy, who
might be reluctant to cross it; it might see the herd as a source of
salvation and safety, and so on.
Talk of instinct here would be correct and misleading at
the same time: correct, because the reconceptualizations that
the gazelle does of its subjective environment can hardly be
viewed as the result of sophisticated reasoning, or of preceding
experience with similar situations (although, of course, the latter
may certainly play a role). Misleading, because it is extremely
unlikely that the control system of the gazelle is hardwired to
do things like “looking for salvation beyond the river if a lion
is behind me, the herd is too far removed, and the river is wide
enough to be a problem for it; but only if the offspring is safe.”
This would only be possible in a giant lookup table like those of
computational psychology, and mind/bodies simply are no such
tables (if only because there is no homunculus inside who could
look them up). Without representations, no component of the
gazelle’s subjective situation (the lion, the herd, the river, and so
on) could be present to its control system; and, without a however
small leap of intuition and creativity, no acknowledgment of the
possible moves and their comparative chances of success, and
therefore no situated decision, would be possible.
Thus, the notion of instinct is of little help. What happens
is instead that the animal continuously reconceptualizes the
surrounding environment. This is certainly made possible—
indeed, generated—by the gazelle’s specific biology, comprised of
its phylogeny and ontogeny, but no less mental for this. What
is misleading about the notion of instinct is the impossibility
for such label to capture the actual nature of Intentional control
systems. The advantage that such systems offer, compared to non-
Intentional ones, is precisely that they work on dynamic flows of
meanings, not on hardwired sensory/motor relations.
Reconceptualization means that a tight semantic coupling to
the world is maintained.Meanings are not in the world, but in the
animal’s experience in each moment. The animal’s past history is
crucial in the generation of its current experience, not because it
has been coded and stored for future reuse, but because it is what
has led the animal to the particular state in which it currently is.
The mind exists exclusively in the present, but such present is the
child of the past, and results from the integration of the past with
the world as it is now (Glenberg, 1997).
An agent’s cognitive dynamics across time results from the
interaction of its mind/body with the surrounding (mental,
bodily, physical, and social) environment. Interaction at any
instant ti is causally generated by the state in which the
mind/body was in the instant ti−1 that immediately preceded,
together with co-occurring factors that may affect its functioning,
like the activity of sensory receptors, emotional and thinking
processes (whatever they are in each species), the effect of various
blood chemicals, and so on.
Each “slice” of a mind/body dynamics thus is the product of
that dynamics so far, meshed with the meanings found in the
interaction in which the animal is currently immersed. This way,
it is neither a mindless body nor a disembodied mind that causes
the overall dynamics: the state of an agent’s mind/body at any
slice of time plays a causal role in the state of that mind/body at
the subsequent slice of time.
In its turn, interaction at ti will contribute to generate the
state of the mind/body in the instant ti+1 that will immediately
follow. Thus, in each instant interaction results from all the
interactions at ti−n. Memory and learning are to be understood
as modifications of each possible future experience, rather than
independent, switch-on/switch-off “cognitive functions.” The
pattern of development of such history results from the biology
of that particular organism, so that it definitely is not a matter
of nature vs. nurture (or of rationalism vs. empiricism) that we
have here. Viewed from a biological vantage point, these are false
dichotomies (see, for example, Lorenz, 1965).
Intentional systems thus are in no way “less biological” than
non-Intentional ones, unless one believes that biology needs to
be eliminativist, and such eliminativist biology is then opposed
to a mentalist psychology supposed to have nothing to do with
biology. That this conception has ruled both disciplines for
several decades is the consequence of the acceptance, on both
sides, of Cartesian dualism and its legacy. There is no reason to
accept such position; indeed, there are several reasons to reject it.
Let us now go back to Serengeti. The gazelle that is fleeing
from the lion is not “behaving”: it is giving an overall meaning
to the subjective environment in which it finds itself, and
reconceptualizing in its light the environment itself, looking for
affordances relevant to such meaning.
Of course, the lion who is chasing the gazelle does, in its own
way, the very same.
AGENTS
We can now define an agent as an Intentional, conscious
organism who lives in a situation, and strives continuously to
make it more to her liking3. What we call the situation is a
subjective, dynamic, and open map of the world.
This definition allows to exclude several entities that, albeit
self-propelled, do not act in any sense of the term (if not, possibly,
in a metaphorical one): household appliances like the thermostat
3Our definition is akin to Pollock’s (1993); however, his was cast within a
computational perspective instead of a first-person or consciousness-based one,
and thus developed in wholly different directions. Analogously, our use of the word
situation has nothing to do with situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983).
Also, we are aware that a clinical psychologist, a psychoterapist, or a sociologist
might object that the locution “. . . to her liking” is extremely ambiguous under
most circumstances.
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that operates the air conditioning in this room, the computer on
which we are writing this paper, or, in a very different fashion,
the mosquito that, aware of nothing, is flying around us, trailing
the heat of our body and the carbon dioxide that it produces.
Yet, each of these entities or living beings has been characterized
as an agent proper in other paradigms within the cognitive
sciences.
In our definition, an agent can only exist in biology if it
entertains with the world the kind of relation that Maturana and
Varela (1980) call structural coupling. The Intentional features of
this relation were discussed in a previous section, as well as the
remark that they must satisfy a constraint of compatibility, not
correctness, with respect to the real world.
One implication of the latter consideration is that several
different types of agents can exist in principle, and do indeed exist
on this planet. Actually, there exist as many types of agents as
representational species, and smaller differences occur between
the various individuals that belong to each. Each (type of) agent
will see its own set of world dynamics and possibilities for action.
Human beings assume that they can entertain objective
knowledge because they are capable of generating descriptions
of the world and exploiting them for action as well as for
intersubjective, publicly shared, and agreed-upon consideration.
However, this is only our specific way of knowing, compatible
with the ultimate truth (Kant’s Noumenon, 1781) but neither
closer to it nor more objective than that of other species (Nagel,
1974, 1986).
Let us consider again the coupling between an agent and
its world. What is coupled is the agent’s internal dynamic
and the external ones. The world has dynamics of its own,
which depend on its properties at the various levels that can
be considered: chemical, physical, geological, meteorological,
astronomical, biological, and so on. For the scope of this paper,
however, it will not be necessary to discriminate between these
diverse entities: we will just gather them all under the label
“external dynamics.”
An animal’s internal dynamics include the meanings that
it finds in the external ones; circularly, the external dynamics
may be said to be generated by the internal ones. Each external
dynamics thus corresponds to one of the entities that are
interesting for the animal and, while such entity is present to
the animal’s mind (that is, while it subjectively exists), it is a
continuous flow of mutable, self-modifying meanings.
It is necessary to conceive of such dynamics as flows because
the world is mutable. To the gazelle, a small dot which is rapidly
getting closer can suddenly turn into a lion, but then it may begin
to chase another member of the herd, or it may reach too close to
the place where the younglings are. The river may be too rapid to
cross, but then open into a slower bend that permits safe wading;
but, with the lion getting closer, the perceived dangerousness of
the rapid trait may decrease to the point that attempting to cross
it becomes preferable to being killed. A control system has to view
the world as flows because the world is a flow, and even more so
is the subjective environment in which an agent lives.
It is necessary to conceive of such dynamics as flows of
meaning because what counts is the meaning of the various
entities, that is, the role that they play in the agent’s overall
situation and the actions they afford. Control systems are not
there to dispassionately, disinterestedly compile inventories of
the entities that exist in the universe, but to do something with
them: eat them, fight them, take care of them, ignore them, have
sex with them, and also—why not, for a species like ours?—put
them into inventories, but meaningful ones. The situated roles
and affordances that characterize each entity are not separate
from the entity itself, or a later attachment to an otherwise
objective, neutral knowledge: instead, they are the very reason
why the mind exists.
It is necessary to conceive of such dynamics as flows of
meaning within an overall situation because each flow exists not
in isolation, but relative to the others that the animal “views” in
each moment. The meanings that each flow has in each moment
depend on the current state of the overall situation and in their
turn contribute to establishing it. The gazelle who is running
from the lion will view the river as an opportunity for salvation,
rather than as a good place for a rest and a drink, not because its
mouth is not dry, or because the water in the river ceases to be
drinkable when there are lions in the neighborhood, but because
the point of the situation has nothing to do with mouth dryness
and drinking. Thus, it is the dynamic meaning of the overall
situation that gives the river its meaning as possible salvation,
and running toward the river modifies the overall situation. It
may, for example, give a sense of imminent salvation that has the
gazelle double its efforts, while finding itself in the wide, open
land might give it a sense that salvation is out of reach, and thus
induce it to accept an opportunity for fighting instead.
ACTIONS
An agent lives in a complex situation, made up of dynamic flows
of meanings.
Each such flowmay subjectively bemore or less pleasurable; or
it may be neutral, which only means that it is neither particularly
pleasurable nor particularly unpleasant. Most of the times, a
flow will be more pleasurable under certain respects and less
under others. The greater or lesser pleasantness of each dynamics
depends both on the dynamics itself and on how it fits into the
overall situation4.
To act is to alter such flows so to make the overall situation
more pleasurable. The change in the animal’s overall situation
depends on specific interventions upon specific features of the
subjective environment. Each flow of meaning that contributes
to making up the overall situation may offer opportunities for
action; to intervene upon one or another such flow depends on
their respective pleasantness, on their respective contributions
to the pleasantness of the overall situation, on the apparent
possibilities for successful action and, all in all, on the balance
of contingencies and opportunities that the agent views in the
world.
Since the world is dynamic, and follows causal paths of its
own, to act is to interfere with one or more such paths so to
alter its spontaneous evolution. An action thus is an induced
4Of course, such a one-dimensional conception of emotions and motivations is
definitely too rough; however, it may do for our current purposes.
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modification of the dynamics that the subjective environment
would otherwise undergo. Since the agent’s capabilities for action
are limited, the agent will focus on one such dynamics, or on a
few, leaving the others to their natural course.
Furthermore, since the world is dynamic, to act requires
monitoring its spontaneous evolution, interweaving one’s own
moves with it and managing to dynamically coordinate the
relation between action and world. This requires at least a
minimal capability of prediction of what the evolution of the
world will be with or without the agent’s interference, or with
different possible interferences. Action is intrinsically situated:
were it not so, there would simply be no action at all. Of course,
these capabilities of monitoring, prediction, and coordination
will be different between species (and, within each of them,
between individuals). Each species lives in its own type of
subjective environment, and acts within it.
Since the subjective situation is mutable, the agent will move
from one flow of meaning to another, always trying to make the
overall situation more pleasurable. This process is continuous
and seamless. Exactly as the world is a continuous dynamic flow,
so are the agent’s mind and actions.
Actions, thus, have no beginning and no end other than the
points in time when the agent sets their beginning and their end;
and they are not chosen out of a repertoire which univocally
defines their preconditions, effects warranted by default, and
procedures of execution, as it happens instead in most classic
theories of planning, both in psychology (e.g., Newell and Simon,
1972; Shallice, 1982) and in classic artificial intelligence (e.g.,
Fikes and Nilsson, 1971; Russell and Norvig, 2009), or even in
ethology, with the notion of ethogram (Jennings, 1906; Makkink,
1936). The surfer who rides the ocean waves, exploiting their
push, trying to keep her balance by simultaneously following
the waves and fighting them, provides a better metaphor of an
agent’s life than the game of chess does, with its discrete and
precisely definedmoves carefully picked out of a closed repertoire
and staged in a closed world, where nothing happens except the
moves themselves, one at a time.
In other words, there is no intrinsic ontology of actions,
except for the one that the agent will throw in at each moment.
Similarities between situation/action couples, of course, allow an
observer to generalize and abstract, but that does not mean that
such generalizations capture a natural subjective ontology. The
subjective ontology of action will depend, moment by moment,
on the situation in which the agent finds itself and on the interests
that it pursues in it.
This shows particularly well if we consider what might be
called the granularity of actions, or, better still, the minimal unit
of action. When we say that “an agent is doing something,” what
do we mean, precisely?
What the agent does is to alter, in a direction which it
foresees as favorable, the spontaneous evolution of the world,
by leveraging on one of its characteristics. The ontology of the
representation that the agent has of the world dynamics are not
predefined, but they are created, moment by moment, according
to the agent’s interests and to the contingencies and opportunities
that it views in the world. The same holds for actions, which
are the external counterparts of representations. The ontology of
action is created moment by moment, because that is also how
what the agent represents is generated.
This may be viewed as a reformulation of the idea that what
a representational animal does is to live within its situation, not
to behave in greater or lesser accordance to the descriptions that
an external observer might give. Furthermore, there can exist no
repertoire of possible actions stored in an unconscious subsystem
placed out of the here and now, if only because no stored recipe
could be coupled to the current state of the world.
Thus, there also is no fixed minimal unit of action; at each
time, the minimal unit of action will be what the agent decides
it to be. To look inattentively at a landscape from which no
danger is expected, while slowly grazing in the grass, is as much
an “elementary” and “unitary” action as it is to focus in sudden
alarm on a particular dot in the landscape, wondering whether it
could be a lion.
Nor would it be a good idea to consider “elementary action”
the minimal body movement possible to an individual. This
would make no sense from the psychological or the physiological
points of view, because we do not usually reason in terms
of physical movements (except when we are learning a new
movement, or when a breakdown occurs during action) and
because to define such minimal movement would be impossible:
the activation of a single motor neuron? and on what temporal
scale?
The perspective that we are trying to outline relies on
a radically non-dualist conception of the mind/body. The
subjective situation in which the agent finds itself includes at
least (for several species, only) visual, auditory, olfactory and
other types of perceptions, as well as proprioceptive information
concerning posture, what parts of the body are in touch with
what, and so on. Such information may have variable degrees
of granularity, according to the global properties of the situation
and to the contingencies and opportunities that the agent views
within it.
To act is to coordinate these information with the decision
one is making, reconceptualizing at each moment the position
that the head, the eyes, the limbs and the rest of the body should
have. The realization of an action is thus the direct counterpart
of the intention to perform it: it requires nothing more than that,
nothing that is not already “contained” in the intention.
This makes no sense in a dualist “mind sends commands to
body” perspective or in an eliminativist “mindless body moves
according to instincts, neural firing, or reinforcements” one.
However, it becomes reasonable in an Intentional view of the
mind/body as one of the material properties of a control system
which includes the whole nervous system, as well as its relations
with the rest of the body and the surrounding environment5.
5In any case, there seem to be no other possibilities. Computational psychology,
cast in terms of libraries of operators (that is, of an abstract, objective and
predefined ontology of actions), must at a certain point deliver the responsibility
for their realization to non-representational capabilities “of a robotic kind” (see
for example McDermott, 1987; Harnad, 1994). At the other end of the spectrum,
Searle (1983; 1992) claims that a “nonrepresentational Background” is in charge of
the task, but then his description thereof remains somewhat mysterious. One of the
advantages of the position that we are advocating here is that it makes sense of the
relations between phenomenal dynamics, body dynamics, and external dynamics.
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Thus, what happens is not that the agent represents a goal
and, while time magically stands still, searches an inner store for
the action(s) that will provably realize such goal, and sends the
decision through a descending hierarchy of “levels of abstraction”
until it somehow is translated from the cognitive into the bodily,
becoming a sequence of commands delivered to the effectors
for execution. What happens is instead that the agent singles
out, in its subjective environment, a certain dynamics which
offers some desirable opportunity (what might be called an
attractor), and in so doing it reconceptualizes the whole of its own
mind/body system in the realization of the relevant intervention,
remaining at each moment coupled to the dynamic subjective
environment. Perception, decision, action, and feedback are not
different phases, possibly assigned to different subsystems, but
different viewpoints that an observer may take of the mind/body,
while the mind/body simply coordinates with the world.
This conception owes a lot to Gibson’s (1977, 1979) notion
of affordance. In a possible reading of his work, the entities of
the world present themselves as attractors, variously positive or
negative, that are afforded (hence the neologism) to the animal.
Affordances are neither in the world nor in the animal: they
reside in the interaction between the two. What the world puts
in the interaction (and makes Gibson talk of direct perception) is
the resources and the constraints to which the animal’s control
systems must conform, such as the invariants of the optical flow.
What the animal puts in the interaction is its own nature, which
makes a certain configuration of light, a certain texture, and so
on, take the subjective shape of a certain affordance6.
META-INTENTIONAL ARCHITECTURES
We defined an Intentional agent as a conscious organism
who lives in a subjective, open, and continuingly revised
interpretation of an ultimately unknowable environment—what
we call the agent’s situation—and strives to make it more to its
liking. The agent’s mind is the experience of a complex flow of
meanings, and meanings are dynamical affordances.
Let us now go back to the control systems of animals. In our
extremely large-scale theory of the phylogeny of control systems,
the first big transition which they underwent is the appearance
of representations. The second is the appearance, in one or
few evolutionary lineages within mammals, of what we will call
meta-Intentional control systems.
Let us start from a related notion, that of metacognition.
This term was first introduced by Flavell (1979), who defined
it as the ability to think about thinking, and has since
been used mostly in the area of human social cognition and
communication (e.g., Tirassa and Bosco, 2008). However, it is
misleading insofar as it seems to refer to a set of capabilities
that make up a supplementary, “upper cognitive layer” that
adds to a “base cognitive layer” without actually changing
the meaning of the latter, but simply manipulating it or
exploiting it when needed. This is the case, for example, with
logical and formal metalanguages, upon which the notion of
6We are not claiming that Gibson would agree with our proposals, but only that
we have been influenced by our understanding of his work.
metacognition is framed. Such conceptions, however, cannot be
applied to psychology or biology, precisely because they rely on
a propositional (that is, formal, syntactic, and recursive) notion
of mind, which could only work under the assumption that
there is a homunculus inside who is in charge of operating the
system, knowing when and how to nest the propositions, how to
manipulate them, and so on, meanwhile losing meaning (Searle,
1980).
The mind is one; it is not composed of layers, least of all
layers of nested computations. “Metacognition” can in no way
be independent of, separate from, or placed above an alleged
“rest of cognition”; on the contrary, it is intrinsic to the human
way of knowing the world, that is, to the internal dynamics of
the human mind. The dynamics that we see in the world, their
pleasantness, and the affordances that they offer are immediately
and intrinsically made different by such capabilities.
In our proposal, meta-Intentionality refers to a whole
constellation of interwoven capabilities that can be resumed as
the idea that the individual itself—including its body, its mind,
its history, and so on—becomes part of what is represented.
Roughly, while Intentional control systems can be said to
experience the world, meta-Intentional ones can be said to
experience themselves in the world.
Meta-Intentional minds actually are a subset of the Intentional
minds, but one that is enough interesting to warrant a separate
discussion. Because our comprehension of the minds of the other
primates and of the cetaceans still is so unsatisfactory, the only
known species that can safely be said to belong to this class is
ours; however, that at least one meta-Intentional species exists is
enough to require consideration.
The mind of a meta-Intentional agent has as its object of
experience the agent itself, immersed in and interacting with its
subjective environment as it is, was, or could be. This flow is
based upon a narrative infrastructure which includes “islands”
of description and explanation of the meaning themselves. Such
descriptions and explanations offer further opportunities for
actions, or affordances.
Suppose you are arriving at a friend’s party. As you enter, the
host introduces a person to you; she smiles and pronounces her
own name; you pronounce yours and shake hands with her. After
a brief exchange, you go on to meet the other guests. Some of
them you know, some you don’t, so you probably get introduced
to a few other persons. After a while you chance upon the person
whom youmet on your arrival. Under normal circumstances, you
recognize her face and start the conversation from where it had
been interrupted, maybe searching your memory for her name.
The next day you meet your friend for lunch, and she is again in
the company of that person. If memory does not fail you, this
time you effortlessly remember her name and begin a friendly
conversation, reminiscing about the main events of the party and
letting the exchange go wherever the three of you let it go. If you
and she become acquainted, you will end up recognizing her at
a distance, from her way of walking and the general shape of her
figure.
What has happened? When you first met this person, at
the common friend’s place, you paid attention to (at least)
basically two things: her look—particularly, her face—and her
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name. Like all human beings, you have a specific faculty of
face perception and general person recognition (Paller et al.,
2003; Peterson and Rhodes, 2003), which will of course take due
notice of that person’s lineaments and name. In more detail,
when she is introduced to you you experience her look and
her name; this experience becomes a description of that person,
which in its turn shapes your experience of that person the
next time(s) you meet her, allowing you to recognize her with
increasing certainty. What we have here is a circular (better
still, spiral) relation between “base-level” experience and “upper-
level” metacognition.
Meta-Intentionality is not necessarily reasoning: it is just
the intertwining and coevolution of experience and description
that allows for the re-enactment of the cognitive performance
(Guidano, 1987, 1991). Experience gives rise to descriptions in
the form of narratives, explanations, maps, and so on; these
become reincorporated into experience giving it new forms,
structures and meanings.
Of course, this process may occasionally become more
deliberate and ratiomorph, e.g., if the second time you meet that
person at the party you have forgotten her name, you might
actively conjure up a way to have her say her name again; or,
if you find yourself interested in her, you might actively try to
build an understanding of her ways of looking at the world, her
interests, and so on. The point is not that these activities are
not possible, but that they are not necessary. In time, the very
infrastructure of your experience of that person will be shaped by
the maps of her that you have built, so that under many, or most,
circumstances, you will know, with no particular attentional or
reasoning efforts, how you ought to behave with her, how she
would react to something that you might say or do, what you can
expect from her, and so on. Your descriptions will have melted
into your experience, changing its shape and allowing for new,
more complex maps to emerge.
Something very similar happens when we substitute the
notion of explanation for that of description we have just used.
A meta-Intentional mind, or at least that which characterizes the
human species, is structured so to look for explanations of the
events it perceives. Such explanations may be couched e.g., in folk
psychology (e.g., Tirassa, 1999b; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008; Bosco
et al., 2014; Brizio et al., 2015), naïve physics (e.g., Hayes, 1979;
Smith and Casati, 1994; Spelke, 1994; Smith, 1995), and related
ways of looking at the world. Here, again we have the same spiral
relation between experience and explanation; of course, it would
be reasonable to argue that explanation is indeed but a type of
description.
Thus, when we sit in a car and turn the key we have a whole,
complex set of expectations and experience. If the engine does
not start our mind begins to formulate dynamics of possible
explanations. This happens because we have had different kinds
of experience with engines that start and do not start. Such
experience, which begins partial and scattered, progressively
becomes more unitary and, interwoven with fragments of
descriptions and explanation, goes to shape the future experience,
which will present itself already laden with partially ready-made
cognitive structures that in their turn allow a more sophisticated
set of possible action. When the engine does not start, an expert
driver will immediately look at the dashboard to check if it is
turned on, she will try to remember when it was that she had
the battery checked last time, if there is petrol in the tank, and
so on. Each such affordance is made possible by the narrative
structuring of experience which is provided by description and
explanation.
Another crucial feature of human meta-Intentional agency
is plan construction and use. A plan is a resource for action
(Agre and Chapman, 1990), a description that we use to guide
our management of the situation. To build a plan is to imagine
an alternate situation, or several alternate situations, and to
keep it present to our attention while we look for a way to
realize it.
At first sight, plans are the meta-Intentional version of what
simple actions are to a standard Intentional mind. However,
there is something more to this point than when we said that
action always includes a prediction of how the world will evolve
spontaneously and as a result of action. The latter capability,
however sophisticated, only requires a forward projection of
the situation currently at sight (and, as far as memories are
concerned, meshing this with a backward projection). Planning
requires instead wholly alternative situations to be conjured
up—it is, in the same metaphor, a lateral projection.
The example of long-term planning is particularly telling.
When we plan where to spend our holidays next year, we use our
knowledge of the present: we may assume, for example, that we
will be able to count on a certain income, that we will still have the
friends we have today, and so on. This is more the identification
of certain pillars with which to build the alternate situations than
a real prediction of how our life will evolve over the next several
months. It is only after building such alternate situations that
we begin planning, that is, imagining how those situations might
evolve.
Thus, the current situation may contain, as if it were
transparent, its future development; but it does not contain
alternate situations, which have instead to be conjured up
from scratch by projecting possible interferences with actual
or potential dynamics. Such alternate situations will be
dynamic in their turn, which makes the whole operation
comparatively difficult. Planning thus requires more than just
“basic” Intentional capabilities.
Planning is not something that occurs every now and then, or
once in a while. Once a species has such capability, it will play
a role in all of its mental activities. So, we are always making
plans. Everything we do is only understandable as part of a plan:
it is because we always live in several situations, only one of
which is the “real” one, that we can decide, for example, to sit
at a desk writing a paper on a sunny Sunday afternoon. The
writer’s current situation includes being a professional researcher,
pursuing certain intellectual interests, having to earn salary so
to be able to keep a certain way of life, and so on; therefore,
writing a scientific article is just part of the affordances that
she views in the situation. It would make no sense to keep
these knowledge, desires, attitudes, and so on, separate from
the writer’s representation of the situation, or to conceive of
them as add-on, “meta-layer” features plugged into an otherwise
simpler system. They are just part of the writer’s current flows of
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meaning: to be meta-Intentional requires no additional effort to
a meta-Intentional animal.
It follows from this description that a meta-Intentional agent
can also try and modify what we have called pillars and see what
would happen, like a writer would. Indeed, this is the starting
point for fiction, pretend play, story-telling, and the ability to put
oneself in somebody else’s shoes.
Finally, meta-Intentional descriptions allow an agent to
imagine how she would look from the outside. Our control
system is, at least within certain limits, an observer of its
own interactions. One of the result of such observation is a
narrative description of how we would appear from an external
standpoint. This capability plays an immediate role in our agency.
Many features and dynamics of our social life depend on the
internalization of such external descriptions: think for example,
of our capability of obeying abstract social rules, of experiencing
shame or remorse, of thinking we are overweight, or wondering
whether we are sexually attractive.
Furthermore, since our control system uses these observations
from the exterior as a feedback on the interaction that is going
on under its supervision, with the same spiral dynamics we
described above, it can be said to produce, in a sense, behavior,
that is a third-person description of our activity. This, again,
would not be a separate faculty, but an immediate feature of our
Intentionality. Thus, if behavior is conceived of as a function of
the observer, and not of the observed organism, then the only
animals that really do behave are, paradoxically, humans. Which,
of course, is what our commonsense knowledge has always taken
for granted.
CONCLUSION
We are aware that this paper is structured in an unusual
way, so let us try again to make our intentions clear. There
is a general (albeit, of course, not unanimous) consensus in
the cognitive sciences on the very nature of cognition and
action. This consensus relies on the substantial irrelevance of
consciousness and experience, based on the adoption of either
the computational postulate or of various forms of eliminativism.
We include neural reductionism in the latter.
Then there are islands and whole archipelagos of dissenting,
heterodoxical, and truly heretical positions (for large-scale
reviews see e.g., Osbeck, 2009; Manera and Tirassa, 2010; Tirassa
and Vallana, 2010). However, while there are reasons to reject
what we have called the consensus, the alternatives (still?) show
a low tendency to merge into a unitary paradigm, or anyway to
give rise to one.
This has been going on for several years now. It is not
necessarily worrying: after all, most disputes in philosophy, in
psychology, in economics, or in the social sciences appear to be
as old as human culture is, and this does not detract from their
interest or usefulness. In psychology, which is themost important
of our cultural and scientific matrices, eliminativists cohabit
more or less happily with phenomenologists, behaviorists with
psychoanalysts and computational neuroscientists, and so on.
The downside of this situation, however, is a sense that no
dispute can ever be settled, that the same arguments are reiterated
over and over like ready-made tokens or gambling chips. What
we tried to do with this paper is to look for a way out of
this seeming stalemate by avoiding, as much as possible, the
umpteenth discussion about the premises and instead trying to
just develop the consequences of a certain set of premises. Instead
of getting stuck into well-rehearsed arguments, we brought
together a variety of literature, from psychology to biology, from
philosophy to artificial intelligence and tried to see what would
happen if we took certain ideas seriously and tried to develop
some of their consequences.
Of course the attempt is only partially successful, to be
optimistic; the limits and possible objections of this work are
obvious, ranging from the heterogeneity of the sources used
(and sometimes the ambiguity of our interpretations thereof)
to the difficulty of imagining the empirical counterparts and
consequences of our perspective. We might have chosen one
single issue, as circumscribed as possible, and tried to develop
it in relative isolation, but this would have brought us back
to the starting point. Furthermore, we believe that the real
interesting topics—the nature of the mind, the nature and
relations of perception and action, and so on—cannot be
decomposed without losing too much of their significance and
import.
We had to start somewhere, and we definitely are not certain
to have reached anywhere. Yet, we hope that the reader has found
the attempt decently interesting and fruitful.
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